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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
which may not be taken away except by due process.29 In addi-
tion, in a case such as this, a hack driver's license being a condi-
tion precedent to his making of a living, it may be said that the
driver has a property right in the libense from this point of view. 0
Hence, in a proceeding to revoke the petitioner's license for al-
leged withholding of change from passengers, due process re-
quired a hearing, though the statute was silent.
In the instant case, a "hearing" was actually afforded the
petitioner but it was found insufficient on several grounds. The
court pointed out that no essential of a fair trial may be omitted
at such a hearing. "The party whose rights are being determined
must be fully apprised of the claims of the opposing party and of
the evidence to be considered, and must be given the opportunity
to cross examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evi-
dence in explanation or rebuttal.' ' s Here, the "hearing" con-
sisted of a reading of a hack bureau memorandum and an identi-
fication of the driver by the complainants. No actual testimony
was taken, no sufficient previous notification was given petitioner,
and the "record" on which he was suspended was insufficiently
set out.
Power to Compel Production of Documents
The power of investigating committees and commissions to
compel the production of relevant documents and papers is re-
affirmed in Alexander et al. v. New York State Commission to In-
vestigate State Agencies in Relation to Parl-Mutual Harness Rac-.
ing.
2
Though the power of agencies to compel production of docu-
ments is not unlimited, it is quite broad. "The power to require
a witness to produce books and papers is necessarily limited to a
'proper case' . . . [which] is ordinarily one where the books and
-papers called for have some relevancy and materiality to the mat-
ter under investigation.' ' Hence a subpoena duces tecum will be
quashed ". . . only where the futility of the process to uncover
anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious. . . . " The ma-
jority of the court found the information demanded fell within
this definition.
29. Wignall v. "Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E. 2d 728 (1952).
30. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
31. Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N.Y. 347, 352-353, 73 N.E. 2d 545, 547-548
(1947), Heaney v. McGoldrick, 286 N.Y. 38, 45, 35 N.E. 2d 641, 644 (1941), Matter
of Greenbaum v. Bingham, 201 N.Y. 343, 347, 94 N.E. 853, 854 (1911).
32. 306 N.Y. 421, 118 N.E. 2d 588 (1954). The respondent Conunission was
established under section 6 of the Executive Law.
33. Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y. 212, 217-218, 197 N.E. 220, 222 (1935).
34. Judge Cardozo in Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 382, 176
N.E. 537, 539 (1931).
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Judge Dye agreed with this holding but felt 'the subpoenas
were unreasonable in calling for documents as far back as 1946,
four years before petitioners first came under investigation.
Validity of Administrative Regulations
Administrative regulations fell afoul of the displeasure of
the Court of Appeals in two cases decided at the last term. In
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Joseph,35 the regulations involved were those of
the Comptroller of the City of New York as to the allocation for-
mula to be used in cases where a gross receipt cannot in its en-
tirety be subjected to a local tax by reason of the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution.
Whether or not a city or state may include in the measure of
its gross receipts tax, imposed for the privilege of doing business
in the city or state, a share of the receipts from interstate sales
which is properly attributable and allocable to the doing of busi-
ness within the city or state is a question on which the Supreme
Court of the United States has split time and time again, answer-
ing now in the affirmative, then in the negative. 3 The Court of
Appeals has determined the question in the affirmative and has
upheld such levies.
8 7
The statute in point provides that where a gross receipt can-
not be taxed in its entirety due to the Commerce Clause prohibi-
tion, the City Comptroller shall establish an allocation formula so
that just that portion of the receipt which is attributable to busi-
ness done in the city should be taxed.," In carrying out this man-
date, the Comptroller promulgated regulations establishing an
allocation formula based on the-proportion that property of the
company within the city, wages and salaries paid within the city,
and receipts attributable to city business, respectively, bear to
these same factors in country-wide business. 9 These three fac-
tors are then averaged together and if the resultant average is
above 66%%, it shall be reduced to that figure for purposes, of
allocation; if it is below 3313%, it shall be raised to that figure
for purposes of allocation. ° It was this latter provision that was
objected to, petitioners' resultant average having been raised to
331/3% from a lower actual figure. The court held that the use of
35. 307 N. Y. 342, 121 N. E. 2d 360 (1954).
36. See discussion in Constitution of the United States of America-Analysis and
Interpretation (E. S. Corwin, ed.) 202-208.
37. Olive Coat Co. v. McGoldrick, 261 App. Div. 1070, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 471 (1st
Dep't 1941), aff'd 287 N. Y. 769, 40 N. E. 2d 642 (1942).
38. NEW YORK CrrY ADmNISTRATIVE CODE § RR 41-2.0(b), § B 46-2.0(b).
39. NEW YORK CITy COMPTROLLER'S REGULATIONS Art. 211-I.
40. Ibid.
